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in 1695, roving official Edward Randolph drew up a definitive list of is-sues he considered responsible for the persistence of “illegal” trade inthe mainland British North American colonies. this “Account of sev-
eral things”—which, among other problems, highlighted the prevalence
of corrupt customs officers, the use of “obscure” creeks to illegally load
boats, and the lack of interest among governors in fixing these problems— 
proved to be the primary stimulus to action by London rulers, who
passed the 1696 Navigation Act the following April.1 they intended that
this act would put an end to the smuggling that was endemic to most of
the young English mainland colonies despite the adoption of other nav-
igation acts in the 1660s and 1672. Colonial vice-Admiralty courts were
instituted to prosecute contraventions of the navigation acts, and those
charged with enforcing the acts had to give oaths and put up bonds. the
act of frauds was extended to give customs officers stronger search pow-
ers to strong-arm settlers into paying their duties and trading only to Eng-
land in English ships with mainly English crews.2
to scholars interested in the development of England’s (and then
Britain’s) imperial superstructure, this late seventeenth-century clamp-
down on piracy and the creation of a full-fledged colonial customs service
is an important moment in the story of how the metropolitan administra-
tion sought to order the haphazard origins of North American possessions.
yet the act remains less well known than either the legislation adopted a
generation earlier or the later conflicts over enforcement leading up to the
American Revolution.3
Recently, though, historians have approached the issue of the 1696
Navigation Act and its associated mercantilist ideology with renewed
vigor. whereas older, whiggish narratives related a straight forward tale
of the rise and progress of mercantilism that rested on the foundation of
the acts, scholars’ reengagement with the topic stems from a conviction
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that retelling the development of colonial administration from fresh an-
gles could yield useful insights into the political economy of the early
modern English state. Perry Gauci has observed that “economy politics
drove policy far more than conceptions of political economy,” a comment
that embodies the growing sense that laws like the 1696 Navigation Act
were less a product of a government attempting to create a “system” that
would enrich an embryonic nation-state than a function of which par-
ticular political interest group had managed to win the day.4 Likewise,
Steve Pincus, in his recent call to rethink mercantilism, argues that Lon-
don politicians rarely agreed about how the political economy of empire
should function, the result being that there was little consensus at the
center as to whether the periphery should be locked into the mercan-
tilist system inherent in the navigation acts.5
while this fresh approach to political economy takes account of a
wider range of economic thinking at the center of the empire, it fails to
address the role of the colonists who were at the receiving end of the
London legislation and who were (along with exogenous influences like
war) also a crucial factor when it came to determining whether a statute
once on the books could actually be enforced. And, without enforcement,
economic thinking would remain just that—ideas of a few leading thinkers.
indeed, it is on this point that Cathy Matson has responded to Pincus’s
analysis by arguing for “a commitment to recovering all of the ideologi-
cal alternatives that were available to people who were thinking about
the economy throughout the British Empire.”6 Some scholars have begun
to address this issue by looking at why colonists, in a variety of places at
the end of the seventeenth century, might have been motivated by their
own personal situations to join the mercantilist crusade that was em-
bodied by the 1696 Navigation Act. virginia planters supported the to-
bacco convoy system because they understood that it would bestow them
with a lucrative monopoly on the trade of their staple; a commercial elite
with Caribbean interests supported Crown policy initiatives to protect
their own rent-seeking activities; and colonial assemblies turned against
pirates when they realized that it was only with the British authorities
on their side that they might fend off the twin threats posed by the Span-
ish and the indians.7
Not everyone, however, supported Edward Randolph and his cam-
paign to bring traders to heel. with a view to arriving at a more nuanced
understanding of economic practice and culture in the mainland colonies
at this time, this essay examines why the Navigation Act of 1696 failed to
produce widespread cooperation. Most especially, i want to put colonial
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circumstances in the spotlight by suggesting that particular characteris-
tics of early settler society extracted colonists from the customary web of
economic interests that might have made them more receptive to the
legislation. the regulations of the 1696 act failed to stick, in part, because
many trading colonists did not share the economic interests of those at
the imperial center. At the same time, metropolitan officials made a dif-
ficult task harder by viewing colonists as an enemy party while failing to
master the geographical particularities of a growing empire.8 these dif-
ficulties complicate the monolith of mercantilism, which found its suc-
cess as a system despite the failure to enforce regulations from the start
in the colonial mainland as well as the Caribbean. Likewise, a more nu-
anced understanding adds complexity to the contribution of colonists to
the creation of an Atlantic economy, offering an interpretation that sees
them as something other than nascent planters or parsimonious Puri-
tans.9 the navigation acts were contingent because imperial officials
lacked the resources to implement them satisfactorily, because metro-
politan merchants cooperated only when it was in their financial inter-
est to do so, and because the acts were not compatible with the emerging
economic culture of these young, maritime communities. what is more,
this was an economic culture that—unchecked by the 1696 act—was al-
lowed to evolve and become more elaborate long after the British gave up
trying to crack down on the economic activities of mainland colonists in
the 1720s.
The Impact of the Navigation Acts on Colonial Trading Practices
Measuring the success or failure of the 1696 Navigation Act in the main-
land colonies is a difficult—perhaps even impossible—task. Most obvi-
ously, there is no way of determining the proportion of traded goods that
were smuggled. we can also question the value of such an exercise when,
regardless of how much smuggling was going on, trade nevertheless in-
creased under the auspices of the acts.10 while there were officials on
the ground who were hard at work attempting to enforce the letter of the
law, their task was made difficult by the lack of support from a metropole
preoccupied with war and a changeable government unwilling to throw
either money or resources behind the 1696 act. i would argue that ex-
ploring the degree to which those charged with enforcing the 1696 meas-
ures felt them to be a success can provide a useful insight into the impact
the legislation had on existing colonial trading practices and institutions.
the act was created to regularize colonial trading activity and to en-
sure it conformed to metropolitan ideals of economic practice, but did it
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in fact achieve these ambitions? the 1696 legislation sought to accomplish
three goals: first, to create a well-qualified and honest colonial officialdom
that would fully cooperate with London and ably assist in efforts to en-
sure that duties were paid and trade occurred only between England and
the colonies; second, to enlist the cooperation of the colonial governments
so that they would not create laws that might contravene those relating to
trade promulgated in the metropole; and third, to establish colonial vice-
Admiralty courts as independent legal bodies that could successfully pros-
ecute illegal traders.11
these measures were not totally ineffective. More customs officials
were appointed, and the turn of the century saw the creation of an actual
colonial customs service, where previously there had been only a few
haphazardly placed persons charged with enforcing the rules of trade.12
Martin Bladen’s lengthy 1721 report on the state of the colonies enumer-
ated how in South Carolina “the commissioners of the Customs have a
Surveyor General, a Collector, a Comptroller, a searcher, a waiter, and a
Naval Officer to put the Laws of trade and Navigation in execution.”13
the act resulted in the creation of “model” colonies that could legiti-
mately be held up as success stories—virginia being the most obvious
example, especially with the continuance of its convoy system until the
end of the war of the Spanish Succession. No complaints were lodged
against this colony in Bladen’s report, as such governors as Francis
Nicholson and Alexander Spotswood had conscientiously pursued an
ardent desire to regularize the transatlantic trade from their colony. their
efforts were acknowledged in 1702 by customs agent Robert Quary,
who described their “extraordinary diligence.”14 Governor Richard Coote,
the Earl of Bellomont, struggled to bring recalcitrant New york mer-
chants under control, and in 1709 the governor of Carolina claimed, “All
possible precautions are taken by this Government to prevent illegal
trade, the Acts of trade and Navigation being strictly enforsed on all
occasions.”15
Other evidence, however, would suggest that governors were often
economical with the truth in an effort to keep London officials at bay, es-
pecially in proprietary colonies where relations with the center were
troubled. in Carolina, the important frontier settlement of Port Royal
remained without customs officers until the second decade of the eigh-
teenth century; the result, a petitioner wrote, was that “nothing is more
Easie than putting in there . . . and unlading such goods as are prohib-
ited by the Laws of Navigation.” All Carolinians knew, explained the
writer,
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how easie it is to put into Port Royall under the notion
of a Storm or a Leak have a fair Opportunity and temp-
tation of purchasing prohibited french goods from
Curassoe in a market abounding with European com-
modities very proper for Carolina as powder Bullitts,
Bonds, firelocks etc for the indians, Dutch . . . Linnens
and Hollands of all Sorts, Muslins, Callicoes & East
india ware.16
Newly appointed, and newly enthusiastic, surveyor and searcher Richard
wigg still found plenty of smuggling activity around Port Royal follow-
ing the granting of his commission, so much so that he appeared before
the local court three times in the second half of 1714 to bring to account
the illegal traders of logwood from the Bay of Campeachy, brasiletto
wood to Curaçao, and “foreign brandy” to Carolina.17
indeed, instances abounded from other colonies of inadequate cus-
toms provision, truculent governors, and uncooperative colonial gov-
ernments unchecked by the London authorities, who were preoccupied
with fighting the war of the Spanish Succession. A case in point might
be the situation that Bellomont faced during his short tenure as governor
of New york in the immediate aftermath of the 1696 act. On arrival in
1698, two years after his official appointment, Bellomont discovered that
his predecessor, Governor Benjamin Fletcher, had supported rampant
smuggling and created a regime fully invested in ensuring that it contin-
ued to the benefit of those in charge. “the carelessness and corruption
of the Customs and Revenue Officers,” Bellomont explained,
have for some years past been such that though the
trade of this place is four times as great as formerly . . .
yet the revenue from Customs has decreased by one
half from what it was ten years ago; and the merchants
have been so used to unlawful trade that they were al-
most ready to mutiny on some seizures that i caused to
be made.18
Bellomont’s efforts to turn the situation around were met by merchants
who “daily curse and threaten the few persons that have assisted me in
the King’s service,” so that Bellomont was left with no locals who would
help him enforce the 1696 act.19 when Bellomont’s tenure as governor
ended with his death in 1701, New york was no closer to a completely
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legal trade than it had been six years earlier, leaving imperial official
George Clarke still “impatient” in 1705 for the news of Pennsylvania’s “sur-
render” to the regulatory authorities in the hope that this would encour-
age Rhode island, Connecticut, and, hence, New york to follow.20
with upstanding customs officials and cooperative colonial govern-
ments thin on the ground, it is hardly surprising that the vice-Admiralty
courts failed to offer the impartial adjudication that the Board of trade
was seeking. Colonists were good at giving the impression that they sup-
ported London’s new instruments of enforcement by passing legislation
against illegal trade. in 1698 the Quaker colony passed “An act for pre-
venting frauds & regulating abuses in trade,” and a 1699 act provided for
“the better and more speedy execution of justice” for those brought to
court on charges of piracy. the reality, however, was more complex. Rul-
ing councils infuriated the Board of trade by appearing to follow the
spirit of the 1696 Navigation Act but disobeying it in practice.21 Much
objectionable behavior centered on the controversial clause in the statute
that gave colonial vice-Admiralty courts the power to enforce the nav-
igation laws—a power they did not possess in the mother country.22
Pennsylvania’s 1698 legislation negated this authority by including the
“disagreable clawse in Law” that the vice-Admiralty judge had to be as-
sisted in dispensing justice by a jury of Pennsylvanians, whose presence
was to be “taken for Graunted to be the way of Justice in all cases relat-
ing to forbidden trade, which, wth the Fundamentall Laws of England,
stricktly coppyed by us into ours there.”23 Meanwhile, the Carolinians did
not bother with formal legislation but set up their own court with a jury
and used corruption to undermine the independent authority of the
vice-Admiralty judge. Governor Joseph Blake, in league with Justice
Joseph Morton, charged ships with transgressing the navigation acts but
allowed them to pay their way out of prosecution before the cases went
to court.24 Rhode island, a notorious pirates’ nest until the 1720s, joined
in. writing to whitehall in the spring of 1705, agent william Popple, in a
“Charge exhibited against the Proceedings of the Chartered Government
of Rhode island,” stated that “the government does not observe the Acts
of trade and Navigation, but countenances the violation thereof by per-
mitting and encouraging of illegal trade” while also refusing “to submit to
HM and HRH Commissions of vice-Admiralty.” Lord Cornbury com-
plained from a still-recalcitrant New york in the summer of the same
year about naval officer Mr. Byerly, who successfully tried smuggling
cases in the vice-Admiralty court but then proceeded to take “ye goods
into his own custody and sold them for his owne use, for he has not given
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the Queen credit in his accots for her.”25 As these examples clearly show,
customs officials were not upstanding, colonial governments were not
cooperative, and vice-Admiralty courts were not an independent and ef-
fective means of convicting illegal traders.
Such reports made dismal reading for a Board of trade charged with
overseeing colonial commerce, and the general sense that there was lit-
tle enforcement of the navigation laws was confirmed by two reports in
the early eighteenth century: an inquiry in the trade with Curaçao and
St. thomas and Martin Bladen’s 1721 overview of the colonial situation.
Sent out “to the Governors and Proprietors of Plantations” in January
1710, a circular letter explained how,
[H]aving received information that a clandestine and il-
legal trade has and still continues to be carryed on by
several persons . . . under your Government to Curacao
and St thomas . . . we send you an extract of such in-
formation that you may make strick enquiry into the
truth of the several matters of fact alledged therein.
the responses of numerous governors, along with the enclosures out-
lining the relevant evidence, suggest that the Board of trade had not been
wrong in its suspicions.26 indeed, the ongoing links between Curaçao and
other Dutch Caribbean islands, such as St. Eustatius, would suggest that
the trading links that endured these efforts by the Board of trade went
from strength to strength in the course of the eighteenth century.27
Continuing the theme of evasion and smuggling, Bladen’s 1721 re-
port on the state of the colonies duly noted that “daily experience shews
that illegal trade is not to be prevented in a Proprietary Government”
and that
certain Proprietors . . . have broken thro’ the laws of
trade and Navigation, made laws of their own contrary
to those of Great Britain, given shelter to pirates and
outlaws, and refuse to contribute to the defence of the
nei’bouring Colonies under your Majesty’s immediate
government.
Although “not all [are] equally involved in this charge,” wrote Bladen, the
problem would not be fixed until the modes of government in the
colonies had been regularized.28 Still, the failure to do this at the time of
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the 1696 act, along with the blocking by Parliament of the 1702 Reunifi-
cation Bill that had sought to centralize colonial government, meant that
most of what the 1696 act had set out to accomplish was still not in place
some twenty-five years later, particularly in Britain’s proprietary colonies,
which at this time still constituted more than half of the total on the main-
land. the navigation acts had overseen a massive increase in the value of
trade between Britain and its colonies, but a decrease in the power of the
monarch after the Glorious Revolution, the delegation of that power to
merchant-lobbyists, and the exigencies of war meant that these gains were
accompanied by an ongoing and chronic evasion of the acts in the main-
land colonies and the Caribbean, despite the best efforts of such men as
Randolph and Quary.29
The Problem of Conflicting Interests
So why did the effort to bring colonial traders into line with the naviga-
tion acts prove so problematic? i would argue that historians (often as-
suming free trade to be a default choice) have too readily accepted that
colonists would evade efforts to control their trade when, as recent re-
search has made clear, there were plenty of reasons to throw one’s lot in
with the English authorities. Not everyone agreed that merchants should
have the freedom to trade across national borders. And in times of war,
some would cooperate with the state in its efforts to regulate commerce.30
it is therefore worthwhile to look more closely at the mainland colonies to
uncover what it was about the state of affairs there that made so many
traders resist the efforts of English governors, customs officials, and vice-
Admiralty officers. Reflecting on the circumstances that prompted con-
tinued smuggling can provide insights into the particular trading cultures
that were evolving in the colonies at this formative stage of settlement.
A good place to start such a discussion is in the realm of interests. As
historians now question the all-encompassing character of mercantilism,
they have also started to recognize that much discussion about the early
modern economy in the English Atlantic was conducted in the language
of interests. to this end, Perry Gauci has argued that scholars should
look more closely at “the alignment of interest in public debates on reg-
ulation, both within Britain and its empire.”31 interests came in a num-
ber of forms—not only of such groups as the Royal African Company
and merchant-lobbyists but also of individuals seeking to advance par-
ticular agendas. However, not all interests were created equal. Corporate
interests, the public interest, and the king’s interest were viewed as le-
gitimate, whereas private interest was looked on positively only when it
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might be interpreted (however loosely) as actually being channeled
toward the public good.32 in the case of the enforcement of the naviga-
tion acts in the English mainland colonies, loyal Crown officials identi-
fied the triumph of colonial private interests (proprietary interests being
included in this category) over the king’s interest as being a principal bar-
rier to ending illegal trade. Hence, in 1697, Governor Nicholson wrote of
customs officials whose “private interest should oversway their duty” and
of Maryland traders governed by “the cursed thing called self-interest.”
Meanwhile, from the northerly reaches of England’s young colonies,
New Hampshire proprietor Samuel Allen described the inhabitants he
found there in 1702 as “a considerable trading people wholly governed
by their own private interest.”33 the crux of the matter was that colonists
paid little heed to royal authority and instead would “always prefer pri-
vate gain to the general good of the English Nation.”34
unsurprisingly, English officials tended to view the situation in
straightforward terms of who was with them and who was against them.
the reality was more complex. Colonial interests who refused to work in
the king’s interest were diverse, and their reasons for noncooperation
equally so. By looking more closely at these colonial interests, we can
begin to understand their character, their role in stymying the ambitions
of the 1696 act, and, hence, their ongoing importance. these interests
can be grouped into two categories: the proprietary colonies and those
who were appointed to the new colonial customs service and the colonial
communities of which they were members. One major reason the 1696 act
proved so hard to implement was that neither of these colonial interests
found it to be in their interest to cooperate with the king’s interest.
Let us turn initially to the issue of proprietorial interest, which was
essential to the English colonizing enterprise during the Stuart era but
was looked upon less favorably following the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
imperial officials believed that the proprietors themselves were trying to
protect their little empires and therefore had blocked the successful im-
plementation of the navigation acts. this was only partly true. Proprietors
were indeed lukewarm to the king’s interest and often sought to protect
their own power, yet they were also defending their interests against truc-
ulent proprietor-governing assemblies. ultimately, then, these assemblies
managed to promote their interest in smuggling despite the efforts of
proprietors and imperial officials and thereby blocked the exertions of
such men as Randolph and Quary.
the first way in which assemblies triumphed over mercantilist poli-
cies was through their aforementioned habit of completely undermining
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the newly established vice-Admiralty courts. From Boston to Charleston,
proprietary councils established their own courts, made English naval
officers reliant on juries they had selected for judgment, or simply ig-
nored the authority of the British court. in part, these actions were made
possible because proprietors remained uninterested in appointing gov-
ernors who were willing to act in the king’s interest. in a 1696 report to
the commissioner of the customs, Edward Randolph noted that, “yet the
Governors and other officers in the Proprietary Colonies are continued
in their places and no care is taken to appoint others in their stead,
though they maintain and support illegal traders as much as ever.”35 this
situation was even more perilous because a failure to clarify whether pro-
prietary governors had the right to enforce the navigation acts led to the
governors’ insistence that they did have this power, and of course they
used it to appoint allies who helped them to continue illegal trade.36 Fur-
thermore, when men loyal to the king entered office, they were often
quickly thrown out again by the machinations of an opposing faction.
Robert Quary observed just this situation in Carolina in 1702, when the
government
turned out Mr trott, who had given security to the
Commissioners of the Customs, and had their Com-
mission to be Naval Officer at that Port, and have put in
a man who hath spent all his time in carrying on illegal
trade, in which he is still concerned, however, he is fit
for their purpose.37
According to a 1718 report from Carolina, little had changed some sixteen
years later, with the assembly enforcing a 10 percent duty on all imported
British manufactures and making “severall . . . laws very prejudiciall to
trade . . . purely, because they will not tax their own estates.” Now, settlers
would buy cheaper, untaxed, smuggled goods from Holland and Portu-
gal, rather than paying the heavily taxed prices for legal British imports,
which would surely suffer a dip in demand.38
Some proprietors did respond to prods from the imperial center by
strongly reminding their governments to take note of the rules of trade.
yet, in the face of this chronic disobedience by their colonial councils,
these efforts were not overly effective. On more than one occasion, Car-
olina’s Lords Proprietors exhorted their governor in the strongest terms
to enforce the rules of transatlantic commerce. in 1685, instructions to
Joseph Moreton firmly advised him to
233e Enforcement of the 1696 Navigation Act in the Mainland Colonies
take Especiall care that the Acts of trade & Navigation
be observed . . . And if any Ships doe presume to Land
any Goods contrary to these Acts you our governour
are not to faile to cause the same to be Seized Accord-
ing to the said Acts which Acts we formerly sent to
Mr John More bound up in ye Book of Rates to be kept
in ye Secretaryes Office for your information.
And, in 1709, Lord Sunderland set off for the governorship of the colony
with a twenty-five-point transcription of the Navigation Act to ensure that
he fully understood the terms of trade.39 in an attempt to better ensure re-
spect of the king’s interest in the payment of customs duties, william Penn
went as far as appointing a number of water bailiffs to watch over the
coastal areas of his colony and try to prevent smuggling.40
the amount of effort the proprietors of such colonies as Rhode is-
land, Carolina, and Pennsylvania made to enforce the terms of the 1696
act is unclear. But even if the proprietors tried, it seems that they could
not control the political factions of their governments from thousands of
miles away, especially when these governments were determined to act
in the interest of personal profit or a profitable colonial project. indeed,
some commentators observed that those in government had become so
used to acting as they pleased that they had begun to feel that trade free
from English regulation was their right. in 1702, Quary informed the Board
of trade that he had taken up the vice-Admiralty judge’s commission re-
luctantly because he “considered the difficulty that must attend it from a
people that had so long practiced illegal trade and found the sweet of it.”41
these unruly colonial assemblies might have been brought to heel if
the newly minted customs service had been effective, but, as we have al-
ready glimpsed, this was not the case. why was it so difficult for impe-
rial officials to bring customs men on side, despite their having given
their bond? Evidence suggests that customs officers found it hard not to
be influenced by the interests of their local communities; even in royal
colonies, they commonly acted not to protect the king’s interest but in-
stead their own interest and that of their neighbors. the problem was
particularly bad in New york, where Governor Bellomont found “careless
or corrupt officers” and could get “little assistance from the council” to
appoint impartial replacements “because they are most of them mer-
chants.” in virginia, Benjamin Harrison complained about collector Ralph
wormeley, who “used his interests” to get a ship suspected of illegal trade
“released without trial.” these irregularities, argued Harrison, “together
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with the exorbitant fees charged by officers, have brought virginian trade
to such a pass that it can hardly be carried without a loss.”42 Further-
more, when customs officers tried to operate effectively, their efforts were
frequently checked by uncooperative colonial governments. Reiterating
the continued disobedience of the Rhode islanders in 1719, Caleb Heath-
cote explained how officers were prevented from doing their job properly
by poorly maintained defenses and by separate fee schedules devised by
the local assembly.43 Getting customs officers to be physically present in
a colony once they had taken up their commissions also proved prob-
lematic, as did ensuring that they were actually resident in the port of
their appointment. Bellomont complained that two years after officials
had received their commission in England, they were still not in place at
Boston and New york, and Henry Hartwell reported to London that the
virginia collectors “live at a great distance and trust their duty to unsworn
deputies and they to unsworn masters of ships.”44 Finally, even if customs
officials avoided all of these issues, their recordkeeping left so much to be
desired that they failed to provide any hard evidence of illegal trade. Gov-
ernor Spotswood of virginia discovered this in 1711 when, in an attempt
to discover whether any commerce with Curaçao and St. thomas was
going on, he observed that “the books of the Custom house officers give
no light into the matter.”45
indeed, the behavior of colonial customs officials (and possibly
william Penn’s own correspondence with officer Matthew Birch of New-
castle, Delaware) prompted Penn to speculate that the nature of New
world settlement would forever undermine the creation of an effective
and honest service. Lacking the “good morrals and character” of their
Old world brethren, said Penn, colonial customs officials were un reliable
and prone to an overzealousness borne of a desire to make a name for
themselves in these young, fluid societies. thus, concluded Penn, “trade
is Crusht in the Budd, & . . . where trade Ceased the revenue cannot en-
crease.” what is more, in the Old world, traders “will bear Strickt ness
that know the laws, & have often been informed; but in New Colonys, all
ways possible should be used to excite & encourage trade, for that is
serveing Engd & the King.”46 Even though colonial officers had been
made into “established members of the English service” in the wake of the
1696 act, they failed utterly to behave in the same way as their metro-
politan brethren. whether they were too zealous, or too relaxed, the result
was that traders resorted to illegal trafficking away from the principal ports.
when the Board of trade fell out of favor in London during the 1720s, the
imperial customs service became a target for money-saving measures. the
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year 1725 witnessed substantial cutbacks to this already weak service—and
thus it was that the interests of colonists trumped the king’s interest.47
there is one final interest that needs to be discussed: the king’s in-
terest itself. with little clout in the years following the Glorious Revolu-
tion, the Board of trade (the official representative of the king’s interest
in the colonies) not only lacked the resources to bring colonists to heel
but also failed to appreciate the physical size of the colonies and the work
that would therefore be required to police trade. Appeals to the Board of
trade by concerned individuals in the colonies make it clear that those
in the metropole consistently underestimated the task of monitoring the
coastline. while Britons had for a while tried to prevent illegal trade along
portions of the English, welsh, and Scottish coastline and countryside,
the seemingly limitless forests, rivers, coves, and swamps of the New
world demanded surveillance on an unprecedented scale. Penn was all
too aware of this problem when he discussed the enforcement of the nav-
igation acts with his government in 1699: “Our navigable Creeks wher
smal vessells may Load are many, & not so well known in England as they
are to us here,” thus “wee cannot expect yr excellies instructions should
be so exactly framed, nor any Law in England so made, but there may be
some difficulty here to put in execuon every part or Article.”48 Defend-
ing his right to appoint water bailiffs, Penn also used the particular ge-
ography of his new land to explain colonists’ objections to the extensive
powers of the vice-Admiralty. “Our settlements are upon the freshes of
navigable Rivers, & creeks, where the River may be . . . two or three miles
over, to a stones cast over, & 100 miles form the ocean,” explained the
proprietor. with so many waterways used by colonists as places of busi-
ness and trade, the vice-Admiralty court
pretends not only to try Causes that relate to the Kings
revenue, as to unlawfull trade, or Pyracy, but whatever
is done in the River {or Creeks,} other ways, as debts for
victuals, Bear, Sailes, or any thing relateing to the build-
ing of any small Craft; so that they have swallowed up a
great part of the Govermt here, because our commerce
by reason of the nature of our Settlemts, is so much
upon the River & small Creeks of it.49
From Penn’s point of view, metropolitan officials needed to understand
that the scale and geography of the New world made the ordering of
trade there incompatible with Old world methods and assumptions.
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Penn’s estimation of the situation was repeatedly echoed by other
colonial rulers. the ever-perceptive Bellomont commented in 1700 that
when he viewed the geography of New york and Massachusetts, it was
easy to see that “both that country and this are naturally cut out and seated
for unlawful trade, both abounding with creeks, and islands and lurking-
places for vessels to run their goods in.” in particular, Sandy Hook, New
Jersey—directly over the water from the Manhattan peninsula—was the
dropping-off point for illegal imports from the Caribbean, which would
then be “conveyed to york in wood boats etc.”50 Randolph observed that,
in virginia, “every vessel runs a different bay so that it is endless work for
a diligent officer to keep an eye on them,” while in 1704, a frustrated Penn
listened as one of his recalcitrant colonial officials informed him that
“there was no other way to prevent” illegal trade “in so wilde a bay and
so full of creeks as that of Delaware.” what is more, because every colony
was studded with smugglers’ coves, and at any one time, only a few of
the colonies were willing to cooperate with imperial officials in stamping
out illegal trade, there was always the possibility of redirecting illicit cargo
to a neighboring territory. Governors of virginia bemoaned the diver-
sion of trade to Maryland, as its “loose government” was willing to “suf-
fer illegal traders.” Further north, Randolph noted that Bellomont’s efforts
in New york would always fail, as merchants would simply “move their
trade to Amboy, which is nearer to Sandy Hook than New york, so that
it is absolutely necessary for the Jerseys and all the other Proprieties to
be just under the King’s immediate authority.”51
Owing to the geography of the colonies, the English would never
have been able to monitor the coastline fully, even if war had not tem-
pered their ambitions or if they had thrown endless resources at the
problem. Additionally, the failure of the 1702 Reunification Bill, aimed at
ending the autonomy of the proprietary colonies—coupled with the in-
ability of the British customs service to stop large-scale smuggling in its
native isles, despite being locked in a perpetual arms race with the illegal
traders—suggests that circumstances conspired to make an impossible
task even harder.52 to this mountain of problems can be added one final,
decisive factor: the unwillingness of London to invest properly in infra-
structure to police the colonial coastline. Even though major cuts to the
colonial customs service did not begin until 1725, the preceding era had
hardly been one of free and willing expenditure. Colonial governors and
other officials, mostly Randolph and Quary, repeatedly sent requests to
London for additional equipment and men to assist in enforcing the nav-
igation acts. in virginia, successive governors in a span of fourteen years
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recommended the employment of a “small frigate,” “shallops or good boats
and hands,” or “a sloop or other small vessell.” the frequency of requests
for “vessells” suggests that they were rarely acted upon.53
Perhaps the most illustrative instance of metropolitan recalcitrance
was the failure to act on a scheme proposed in 1703 by Robert Quary. in
virginia, vigilant and cooperative governors helped to keep illegal trade
to a minimum, but smuggling was also squeezed out by the convoy sys-
tem that transported the tobacco crop to England in an annual fleet that
operated for much of the war-torn 1690s and 1700s. Supported by the
encouragement of Lord Cornbury, Governor Nicholson, and the elite
planters and wealthy merchants who controlled and benefitted from the
convoy, Quary proposed to the London authorities that, instead of lying
at anchor for the winter, the convoy’s ships might instead be used to bring
the west indian trade—the source of a vast amount of illegal activity—
under control. Quary suggested
that no ships be suffered to go from ye Main to the is-
lands and from thence back but in fleets and under
good convoy; that ye Spring Fleet be made up at New
york at a day fixed by ye sevll. Govrs., yt. ye convoys be
ready to sail at ye day appointed; yt. as soon as ye ships
arrive in Barbados, one of ye convoys shall go with ye
vessels yt. shall be bound to ye Leeward islands, and yt.
as soon as they are loaden in Barbados, they shall make
up ye home fleet at Antego or Nevis, and from thence
hasten back to North America, and that the proper
method be agreed for ye Jamaica trade.54
Quary was sure, he wrote, that “this proposal duely persued will efectu-
ally secure all ye trade of America, without putting HM at any expence.”
Despite its advertised economy, the proposal did not find favor with
those at the center who, for unknown reasons, did not follow through
on Quary’s apparently sensible suggestion.
Disobedience, Interests, and Colonial Economic Culture
Evaluating the interests of those who either resisted or enforced the 1696
act certainly demonstrates that the crumbling of support for the legisla-
tion in London was problematic. with economic policy moving more
within the remit of Parliament, metropolitan commercial interest groups
played an ever-greater role in deciding legislation. the result was a retreat
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from tighter regulation of the economy, just at the moment when new
infrastructure had theoretically been put in place.55 Colonial governors
and officials demanded attention and support from London, but the will
to bolster the 1696 act with further resources was already waning, leav-
ing men like Quary and his virginia allies to struggle on alone.
Added pressure came from those in the metropole who were deter-
mined to cast the colonists in a subordinate economic role, even though
not everyone agreed that this was necessarily the right course of action.
whereas English provincial interests were given a fair hearing by those
in London—who viewed them as equal partners in the forging of eco-
nomic policy—majority opinion deemed the colonial interest to be one
that required subjugation rather than equal consideration. Many whig
politicians did argue that the colonies should have the same relationship
with the center with regard to decisions about the political economy, as
indeed Penn suggested in 1697, when he argued that colonial “trade should
be free of the growth of the provinces, as it is in England from county to
county, where the laws of Navigation forbid it not.”56 the relevant impe-
rial officials disagreed, however.
while the outlook and decisions of those in London are undoubtedly
important for our understanding of why the navigation acts had such a
weak impact on the trading practices of colonists, the colonial situation
itself is equally, if not more, significant. First, the character of govern-
ment in the many proprietary colonies meant that both proprietors and
assemblies stood in the way of effective enforcement as they sought to
further their interests in the face of each other and the metropole. with
these conflicts preventing implementation of the 1696 act in such places
as South Carolina and Pennsylvania, more effective governments watched
as illegal traders simply relocated to a friendlier regime. Also critical was
the failure of colonists who served as customs officials to work effectively
in the interest of the monarch they were serving rather than seeking to
benefit either themselves or their communities. Finally, the situation was
exacerbated by the inability of those in the metropole to appreciate what
would be involved in accomplishing their goals in such a vast and wa-
tery landscape. importantly, these themes are echoed in other fields of
economic activity during the early phases of European settlement. in this
final section, i explore how the disobedience of the colonists with regard
to the 1696 Navigation Act was connected to broader trends in evolving
economic culture—namely, the absence of institutional direction in the
organization of trade, the function of geography in influencing this ab-
sence, and the commitment of colonists to economic networks and trad-
ing communities of their own creation.
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the problems of regulating trade, and the potential for the landscape
to frustrate any efforts to do so, were also prevalent in the early decades
of the trade with Native Americans. Just as metropolitan officials strug-
gled to bring smugglers to heel, colonial officials wrestled with the prob-
lem of recalcitrant indian traders. Both william Penn and the Carolina
Lords Proprietors agreed that trade with indians needed to be under strict
government regulation. Among Penn’s initial conditions and concessions
for the settlement of Pennsylvania in 1681 was the founder’s rule that
there shall be no buying and Selling, be it with the in-
dians, or One among An Other, of any Goods to be ex-
ported, but what shall be performed in Publick Markett
when such places shall be sett apart, or erected, where
they shall Pass the publick Stamp or Marke, if badd ware
and prized as good, and [de]ceitfull in proportions or
weights.
trade with natives, Penn hoped, was to take place in regulated places;
the quality of goods was to be closely monitored, as was the fairness of
the deal. Such ambitions were to be supported by a plan in which the
Free Society of traders, a joint-stock company endorsed by Penn, would
undertake much indian trade, further assisting its conformance to rec-
ognized places and practices of commerce.57
Carolina’s proprietors, and their colonial supporting faction, were
similarly keen to use regulation to order their indian trade (and their trade
in indians). As early as 1680, the Carolina rulers were instructed to “reg-
ulate all disputes in or about trade or Comerce between the Christians
& indians.” throughout the 1690s, proprietary supporters struggled to
get a statute regulating the indian trade through the obstinate legislature.
Getting close in 1698, they managed to set down a set of resolutions on
the issue, the first three points of which noted
that ye: indjan trade Shall be managed by a Publick
Stock for the use of ye publick
that in ye Bill Care be taken yt ye present traders have
time to fetch home their Effects
that every body may buy Skinns at their owne Planta-
tions for their owne use from their Neighbour indjans.
in terms of trying to prevent private gain and tying down the trade to a
specific site that could be regulated, these resolutions were similar to
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Penn’s ideals. Nevertheless, control of the indian trade had to wait until
1707, when a statute was finally passed that demanded that all traders
buy licenses, put up bonds for good behavior, and become answerable to
a board of commissioners created to try abuses.58
Just as colonists and officials navigated around the navigation acts,
they also evaded attempts to regulate the burgeoning indian trade. Al-
though some traders were happy to establish an orderly trade that limited
the quantities of rum sold to indians, confined bargaining to agreed-upon
storehouses or indian towns, and did not favor profit over the destabiliza-
tion of native and white society, many were less willing to conform. As a
result, abundant complaints about the “chaos” of the trading relationship
continued throughout the period. in Pennsylvania, despite legislation
against selling rum to indians—an early priority of the council—complaints
suggest that the numerous laws enacted had only a loose relationship with
reality. Appearing before European officials in 1701, Shemekenwhoa, one
of the chiefs of the Shawanah indians,
Solemnly declared & Complained to the Govr that
Sylvester Garland had brought to the settlement of in-
dians of their nation several Anchors of Rum, to the
quantity of about 140 Gallons, & that to induce them to
receive it & trade with him, he pretended he was sent by
ye Govr, and gave one Cask as a present from him, upon
wch, being entreated to drink, they were afterwards
much abused.59
Five years later, free agents were again causing disquiet among the indi-
ans, who had observed that a
John Hans was building a Log house for trade amongst
them, which made us uneasie, & desired to know
whether they encouraged it. to which they answered that
they did not, and were desired not to suffer any Chris-
tians to settle amongst them without the Govrs. leave.60
Although the colonial council introduced a licensing system to control
traders, this system seems to have had little impact on trader activities.
the story was similar—if more extreme—in early Carolina. with the pro-
prietors unable to control the excesses of colonial indian traders from
their distant homes in England, and with many members of the colonial
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council so embroiled in the indian trade themselves that they were un-
willing to act, traders traded as they pleased. the continuation of trade
on the terms of the traders meant that the flow of indian slaves from the
southeast continued into the early eighteenth century—so much so that
Pennsylvania’s government pushed through a 1705 act prohibiting their
importation into the colony, as arriving Carolina indians gave “the indi-
ans of this province some umbrage for suspicion and dissatisfaction.”61
the 1707 licensing act in Carolina was blatantly ignored, and while the
commissioners appointed by the law dispatched
instructions . . . to the indian traders that no Slave be
sold till they have bin three Dayes in their town. And
that the traders receive no Rum Debts from the indians
nor Relations . . . that itt be an instruction that the
traders doe sease the Slaves or Goods of any Person
trading without a Licence,
the traders themselves persistently disobeyed such commands until the
system collapsed in bloodshed and chaos in 1715.62
As with the enforcement of the navigation acts, the failure of regu-
lation was in no small way related to the inability of authorities to make
their influence felt in a distant and expansive landscape. in Carolina,
those involved in the indian trade were keenly aware that bridging the
massive distances between Charles town, the European center of New
world society, and the indian towns was key to both their trading suc-
cess and their ability to control the trade. Buying their goods from
wealthy merchants based in Charles town, traders had to transport their
wares southwest to where their customers resided. As early trader and
planter John Seabrooke quickly discovered, “the distance from Charles
town to the Nations with whom he had any Dealings” was “very long
and tedious insomuch that the Losses and disapointments he usually
mett whithall in going to and from the Said indians to buy Goods was
very Considerable.” As a result, Seabrooke “resolved to build him a house
wherein to putt and secure his goods in some place that should be neare
more Comodious.”63 Creating such stores—in indian towns and on
plantations—physically relocated the marketplace of the indian trade
many hundreds of miles from Charles town and removed it from the
view of those colonial and imperial officials who hoped to regulate it.
Pushing through the first act concerning the Carolina indian trade in
1707, thomas Nairne sought to overcome the distance issue by fashioning
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himself as a roving agent who would spend ten months of the year touring
indian country. Nairne’s diligence was thwarted, however, by a governor
and executive who undermined him at every turn when they realized
that his efforts might curtail their income from the indian slave trade.64
Subsequent statutes controlling Carolina’s indian trade continued to leg-
islate for an agent who would enforce regulations on the spot, but, as the
colony’s white elites became ever more ensconced in the genteel comfort
of Charles town and its environs, it became impossible to get any high-
ranking official to visit the indian towns, let alone live in them.65 Far from
the center of government, the indian trade would thus continue to occur
in a manner and a place that traders themselves found convenient. in-
deed, traders’ ability to continue to evade central authority even after the
1707 act was strongly reflected in the courts, where large numbers of in-
dian dealers were called to account for unpaid debts to Charleston mer-
chants and for unpaid fines for trading without licenses.66
Repeated efforts to organize indian traders faced the same problems
that Quary and Randolph had confronted when they tried to enforce the
1696 act. these problems—the vastness of the landscape, the factional
tendency of colonial authorities, and the habit of colonial traders to trade
according to their own wishes rather than the letter of the law—all stymied
ongoing efforts to introduce top-down regulation. traders in various sec-
tors of the domestic economy had successfully managed to conduct busi-
ness in a manner that suited their own interests, ignoring the somewhat
tardy efforts of authorities to disrupt their established customs. indeed,
recent research on the relationship of colonists with the Dutch in the
seventeenth century ably reiterates the tendency of colonists to pursue
the channels and methods of commerce that best suited their interests,
even in the face of attempted intervention. Long-established trade net-
works between colonists from New york to virginia with the Dutch sur-
vived successive efforts to curb these networks in the later seven teenth
century. while war put a stop to direct trade between the mainland and
the Netherlands after 1690, English and Dutch commercial associates
continued to find ways to ensure that their profitable relationships con-
tinued into the eighteenth century—a state of affairs that the 1710 govern-
ment initiative to investigate the trade with Curaçao and St. thomas was
no doubt designed to stop.67
Conclusions
Quite often, economic historians have regarded the period before 1720
as the era in which the structures for a lucrative eighteenth-century staple
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and mercantile trading system were put in place. they assess the foun-
dations of a system of slave labor, analyze the “search for a staple,” and
seek to document the processes by which valuable crops were propa-
gated and exported. For those more northerly colonies not involved in
the growing of exotic export commodities, the story is that of the growth
of a coastwise trade in which New England and New york merchants
sent provisions to feed the workers forced into the fields to grow these
crops. in the light of such developments, the navigation acts appear as the
promoters of staple agriculture and the interests of the planters and mer-
chants who were central to its success. indeed, there can be little doubt
that, in this respect, the acts were critical to the growth of an Atlantic
economic system. However, as this essay has suggested, it is also impor-
tant to look at the footprint of such legislation on the trading practices of
colonists and to consider the degree to which such laws were successful
in reshaping the habits of settlers who had already established their own
modus operandi in an era of less-direct interference from the metropol-
itan authorities.
Such an approach yields important insights into the economic struc-
tures of these young colonies. By the turn of the eighteenth century, a num-
ber of colonists had already established a belief in their right to conduct
trade according to their own interests rather than the interests of those
authorities who were seeking to rein them in. indian traders and mer-
chants alike sought to evade the control of provincial governments and
English officials who wished to prevent them from selling rum to indians,
conducting bargains away from places deemed as the proper sites of com-
merce, and trading at will with the Dutch and other European enemy na-
tions in the Caribbean. in large measure, colonists did as they pleased for
three main reasons. First, metropolitan policy was not followed up with
sufficient resources to implement the intended reforms. Second, the colo-
nial institutions were weak and operated within an expansive landscape.
third, the colonial governments, which were riven by internal conflict
and focused on establishing export economies, failed to replicate the types
of institutions that were charged with regulating commerce at the local
community level in the metropole. it is highly questionable as to whether
even the most concerted efforts would have been successful, however.
while English officials failed to grasp the impossibility of marshaling
traders in a country of endless rivers, coves, and beaches, colonial au-
thorities were confounded both by their own disunity and by the lack of
any means to control settlers who were determined to do as they pleased.
As a result, the decades before 1720 must be understood not only as the
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time of the establishment of a British Atlantic commercial system but also
as an era in which colonists learned to see their interest in trading with
whom they liked, where they liked, and when they liked as a right that no
government had the authority to take away from them.
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